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JOHN COLLIER AND
THE PUEBLO LANDS BOARD ACT
LAWRENCE C. KELLY*

IN 1913, IN THE CA~E OF U.S.' v. Sandoval (231 U.S. 28), the
Supreme Court of the United States ruled that Pueblo Indians of
New Mexico, contrary to an earlier decision, had been subject to
federal guardianship since 1848 and were, therefore, incapable of
alienating their lands without federal approval. The Sandoval decision precipitated great consternation in New Mexico where thousands of non-Indians claimed ownership of former Pueblo lands by
purchase from the Indians under the previous decision or by occupancy under New Mexico territorial statutes. For nine years a
struggle ensued between Pueblos and non-Indians for title to the
disputed lands, without resolution. Then, in 1922, Secretary of the
Interior Albert B. Fall, Senator Holm O. Bursum, and attorney
Ralph E. Twitchell, all New Mexicans, drew up a bill that would
have awarded nearly all the disputed lands to non-Indians.
John Collier, who had become enamored of the Pueblos following
a visit to his long-time friend, Mabel Dodge, in Taos in 1920-21,
was in California at the time of the drafting of this "notorious
Bursum bill." There he had become a confidant of Mrs. Stella
Atwood, a member of the General Federation of Women's Clubs
(GFWC), who had recently become interested in the reform of
federal Indian policy. Through Atwood, Collier was introduced to
Mrs. Kate Vosburg, the wealthy heiress to the fortune of Jonathan
S. Slosson, the founder of the city ofAzusa. In 1922 Vosburg agreed
to finance Collier's activities in behalf of the GFWC reform program for a two-year period. In his official capacity as publicity agent
for the GFWC, Collier returned to New Mexico in September
1922. When he arrived, he learned that the Bursum bill had just
passed the U. S. Senate. News of its passage, he wrote to Mabel
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Dodge, was a "body blow," for he had been assured that the bill
would 'not come up at this session of Congress. "This will mean
the ruin bf the Pueblos," he informed Mabel, "I am sicker at heart
than anything has ever made me; but perhaps the bill will be held
up yet." Immediately, he set out to organize an opposition. Because
of the "almost incredible camorra" that he found in Santa Fe, he
warned her not to "mention my present activity to anyone.... "1
But some of the Anglo residents of Santa Fe were also aroused.
Chief among these were Dolly Sloan, the diminutive former business manager of The Masses and wife of the expatriate New York
painter, John Slo,an; the Harvard poet, Witter Bynner; Alice Corbin
Henderson, a former ~oeditor with Harriet Monroe of Poetry mag~
azine; E. Dana Johnson, the editor of the Santa Fe New Mexican;
Edgar L. Hewett, founder and director of the. Museum of New
Mexico; and the painter Gerald Cassidy and his wife, Ina. Under
the leadership of Margaret McKittrick and ElIzabeth Shepley Ser~
geant, the latter an essayist who had important contacts with east":
ern magazines, the group quickly formed itself into the New Mexico
Association on Indian Affairs (NMAIA). Through Elizabeth Sergeant, Collier was put in contact with the association, although it
was never to take him fully into its confidences. 2
During September and October 1922 Collier's major goal was
to inform the Pueblo Indians about the Bursum bill and to organize
a publicity campaign that would attract national publicity to their
plight. In accomplishing the first task he was greatly aided by
Antonio Luhan, Mabel Dodge's Taos Indian companion. Tony 'introduced Collier to Taos Pueblo leaders, and there he had "a great
many meetings with the duly elected council." The Taos council,
in turn, furnished him with letters of recommendation to the other
Pueblos and, accompanied by Tony Luhan, he traveled down the
Rio Grande to PiCuris and Cochiti. At Cochiti the idea of assembling
all the Pueblos together in a demonstration of unity was born.
Whether this idea originated spontaneously with the Indians, a~
Co~lie; claimed, or whether it originated with Collier, who by thi~
time was familiar with the story of the famous Pueblo Revolt of
1680, is unclear. In any event, such a gathering immediately appealed to his se'nse ofthe dramatic, and he cleafly saw the publicity
'
potential in such a gathering. 3
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On 5 November 1922, at Santo Domingo pueblo, 121 Pueblo
delegates from twenty pueblos met to discuss the Bursum bill. For
two days and "the greater part of two nights" Indians listened as
Collier and others explained the bill's provisions: According to
Collier, the meeting was "exclusively in the Indians' hands" with
the whites retiring at times when the Indians wished to discuss
matters privately. At the conclusion ofthe meeting, the delegates
adopted a memorial addressed to the American people. In it they
protested the loss of their lands. They also complained that they
had not been consulted about the Bursum bill and that the Interior
Department had refused to explain its provisions to them. They
refused to accept the jurisdiction of the federal court, which they
said would mean the destruction of their traditional form of government. This memorial was translated. and written' down '~ver
batim" by Father Fridolin Schuster, a Franciscan priest from Laguna,
and then typed by Collier for release to the press. Although the
memorial. was a major document, Collier counseled in a letter to
Frank Kellogg, the editor of Survey magazine, the truly important
thing to be emphasized was that the Pueblos had banded together
once again, had made their decision unanimously, and had agreed
to form a "permanent junta" to defend their lands and their way
of life. 4
News of the Santo Domingo meeting quickly spread throughout
the nation. The New York Times printed the memorial the following
day and ran a story by Elizabeth Sergeant' in its· Sunday feature
section later in the month. On 29 November,· Herbert Croly, at
the request of Elizabeth Sergeant, ran an editorial in The Nation
denouncing the Bursum bill, and that same day an article by Alice
Corbin Henderson appeared in the New Republic. Simultaneously,
editorials defending the Pueblos appeared in the New York World
and the New York Tribune, both the results of appeals by Margaret
McKittrick and Elizabeth Sergeant. The appearance of,thesearticles produced a request for copy from other newspapers and'
magazines, which in turn resulted in even greater news coverage
.
in December and January.5.
As opposition began to build following the Santo Domingo meeting, Collier, who from the beginning had advised that "the job is
a heap more than beating the Bursum' bill," decided to increase
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the pressure. There would be no compromise with the Bursum
bill as Indian Commissioner Charles Burke was urging, he told his
closest friends. Instead, a rival bill would be prepared by the Indians' friends. To dramatize Indian opposition to the Bursum bill,
Collier planned to take a delegation of Pueblos to New York City
in December and then on to Washington where they would appear
before the House Indian Affairs Committee. In preparation for this
trip, he advised Mabel Dodge, "I am seeing the political folk,
writing a lot, seeing the newspaper folk and trying to raise money."
Dr. John Haynes and Kate Vosburg, his chief financial supporters,
also entered the fray. Haynes agreed to contact Senators Hiram
Johnson of California and William Borah of Idaho to enlist their
support against the Bursum bill, and he also asked Gifford Pinchot
to meet with Collier during the eastern trip. Vosburg and Haynes
"separately or together are prepared to do whatever has to be done"
in the matter of finances, Collier wrote, but he hoped "not to call
on them excessively as they are our permanent reliance for the
fight which this eastern trip is only an incident in."6
On 21 November 1922, the day after Congress reconvened from
its summer recess, Senator Borah, in an unusual move, requested
that the Bursum bill be recalled. It had been passed during the
hectic last days of the last session "under a misapprehension as to
what its terms were," he said. Borah's surprise move produced
jubilation in the Collier camp and strengthened his determination
to escalate the struggle. Under no circumstances, he wired Stella
Atwood, must the Interior Department be permitted to amend the
Bursum bill until after she and the Indians had been given the
opportunity to testify against it. "Use utmost power to prevent
action .... Action before our arguments heard means war," he
wired her. Borah's action also strengthened Collier's determination
to press the federal government for a complete change in its Indian
policy.7 On 26 November he wrote to Mabel Dodge:
I know the danger that this work will achieve merely material results
and eventuate in welfare and things static. Certainly I am determined that it shall not go to such an end. For twenty years I worked
at things meant to be dynamic and creative which mainly worked
out into amelioration, welfare, etc., arid I hope it won't be that way
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again! As for the Pueblos, there's reason to hope and plan, now,
where a year ago we could only dream and lament.
We shall have to establish the right to dictate Indian policy, and
build up a truly national movement, and get ourselves strong "on
top" politically, before we can demand for the Pueblos the kind of
thing·you write ·of. At this time ... the public policy is wrong and
it is being executed still worse and it involves all the Indians; and
it can be changed (policy and administration) only through a national
effort .... We couldn't swing the needed power simply through a
fight based on the Pueblos. After power is established, then we can
get the fundamental change needed for the Pueblos. @8

Soon after this avowal to "dictate Indian policy," Collier left for
the nation's capital. Before doing so, however, he met in Santa Fe
with the officers of the NMAIA. They agreed to retain the services
of a Santa Fe attorney, Francis C. Wilson, former Pueblo attorney
who had successfully argued the rights of the Pueblos in the Sandoval decision. Wilson would represent the GFWC and the NMAIA
before the congressional committees when hearings began in early
1923, and he would also draft a new bill that they would attempt
to substitute for Bursum's. At almost the identical time of this
meeting, Albert Fall, stung by the criticism directed against his
office, lashed out angrily against his detractors. First, he let it be
known in New Mexico that refusal to compromise would result in
the reinstitution of legal proceedings against the 3,000 white settlers that had been suspended in 1921 pending the attempt at a
legislative solution. His intention was to unleash a white ba;cklash
against the. Indians and their supp6rters. Then on 5 December
1922, Fall ,released a thirty-five page defense of his role in the
drafting of the Bursum bill, a defense that was addressed to Senator
Borah. In it he denounced the "propagandists" whom he claimed
had. misled' Borah, and he. particularly singled out fqr criticism
Francis Wilson, whom he charged had been delinquent,while
Pueblo attorney, in protecting the lands of the Laguna Pueblos.
After a lengthy review of the Pueblo problem, Fall challenged
Congress to "provide for an immediate investigation" of the situation, at which time he promised that his department would turn
over all its evidence that "these propagandists had engaged in misleading statements, some of them in absolutely false statements."

Holm O. Bursum. Ralph E. Twitchell, Leading Facts .afNew Mexico History, vol.
5, facing p. 414.
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The following day,· Chairman Homer P. Snyder of the House Indian
Affairs Committee, defended the Bursumbill in remarks inserted
into the Congressional Record .and then, at the request of the
Interior Department; introduced a slightly revised edition of the
original Bursum bill. .In what appeared to be a smoothly orchestrated assault on the opposition, Indian Commisioner Charles Burke
theri had 5,000 copies of Snyder's speech printed at his own expense. These copies, together with an equal number of Fairs letter
to Borah, were distributed throughout the nation under Snyder's
frank. 9
Upon his arrival in Washington Collier immediately plunged into
a round of conferences with other Indian defense groups. First he
met with Father Schuster and Father William Hughes ofthe Bureau
ofCatholic Indian Missions. Hughes was a good man, Collier wrote,
"but not aggressive at all" and "very solicitous" that nothing be done
to injure Indian Commissioner Charles Burke. He next met with
Gen. Hugh.L. Scott and Malcolm McDowell of the Board ofIndian
Commissioners. From them he learned "of the state of terrorism
in the Indian Office which Fall had instilled." Then he met with
William Hard, a Washington correspondent for the Nation and with
Robert Yard,> a lobbyist for the National Park Service. At Yard's
urging; Collier adopted the theme that would dominate the publicity campaign of the next several months: Albert Fall, whom Yard
described as "besotted in his sense of power,". was to be made the
target of all the oppositio~ groups. 10
On the day after Christmas a decision ,was reached about the
proper means of introducing Francis Wilson's rival bill. Nearly
everyone> advised that as a matter of courtesy, Senator Bursum
should be permitted to sponsor the new bill. But, Collier argued,
Bursum had given no indication of willingness to sponsor the bill,
and it was evident that Fall would press the revised Bursum bill,
now denominated the "Snyder bill," before Congress. "On behalf
of the GFWC," Collierargued, Senator Andrieus A. Jones; a Democratwho had defeated Bursum for the senate seat in 1916, should
introduce the bill. "The others passively consented," he reported.
Fall and Bursum, Collier gleefully wrote Mabel Dodge, "were
furiously trying tq arrange something, probably anew bilL ...
Fall is in a white rage and all are being dominated by their emo-
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tions, not their judgment. We should avoid similar mistakes." In
the two weeks prior to the congressional hearings, Collier's mood
was alternately confident and doubt-ridden. Fall's often rumored
resignation from the cabinet was announced on 3 January 1923.
This unexpected event, plus the formal introduction of the Snyder
bill, temporarily disrupted Collier's strategy, but, as he wrote Mabel Dodge, the original Bursum bill "thank goodness, is still not
dead, but can be exploited as a menace and an evidence of con.
"11
splracy....
On 15 January 1923 the senate hearings on the various bills
began. Although the hearings were to prove inconclusive, they did
serve to make clear the distinction between Bursum's bill and the
so called Jones bill that Francis Wilson had drafted in late December.
On the first day of testimony Ralph Twitchell and Commissioner
Burke appeared to defend the Bursum bill and to describe the
manner in which it had been formulated. Both testified that the
bill was clearly a compromise between the claims of the Indians
and those of non-Indian settlers. Burke, whose presentation Collier
contemptuously described as a "vain-glorious, emotional, almost
feeble minded oration," repeated his often-stated belief that any
inequities created by Bursum's bill could be easily corrected if only
its opponents would cease their adamant opposition and sit down
with members of the interior department staff to work out a compromise. 12
.
The brunt ofthe defense, however, rested upon Twitchell. Under
close examination by Senator Lenroot, Twitchell's defense crUinbled
and his composure wilted. Time and again, despite frequent pleas
that his motive had been good, he was forced to admit that the
bill's wording worked exclusively to the advantage of the nonIndians. By the time he completed his presentation, there was
little doubt that the original Bursum bill was indeed a dead letter.
Following the interrogation ofTwitchell, Stella Atwood and Francis Wilson argued the merits of the rival Jones bill. This bill had
two major objectives. The first was the creation of a special Pueblo
lands board or commission that was to be empowered to arbitrate
conflicting claims and to make awards of title in those cases where
both parties were in agreement. Like Twitchell, Wilson believed
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that 80 percent of the con'flicting claims could be disposed of in
this manner, without the expense necessarily entailed in a formal
court case. Disputes that could not be resolved by arbitration were
to be heard by the U.S. District Court of New Mexico where the
Indians,upon the request of fifteen pueblos, would be permitted
to name a counsel of their choice to defend their interests. The
second objective of the Jones bill was authorization of an expenditure of $905,000 offederal money for irrigation and drainage projects along the Rio Grande. The purpose of this section was to create
approximately 20,000 acres of new agricultural land along the river
with which to compensate those claimants, Indian and white alike,
whose claims were denied. Most of the money requested for this
project was eventually to be reimbursed by the users of the land.
Atwood's testimony was brief and mainly confined to explaining
how she had become involved in the controversy as the representative of the GFWC. Collier did not testify at the Senate hearings, but when interest was shown in the Santo Domingo meeting
and Burke and Twitchell charged that Collier had formulated the
resolutions adopted there, he submitted a letter that was published
as an exhibit. In it, he strongly defended the ability of Indians to
understand and to react to problems with which they were confronted. The great evil Indians suffered, he charged, was the attitude of the "Indian Office that Indians should be treated as
incompetents" and denied the normal avenues of information and
expression that the constitution guaranteed to all other Americans.
Francis Wilson, not Collier, hqwever, was the spokesman of the
Indians before the Senate sub-committee. While regretting that
Burke and Fall had chosen to interpret the criticism of the various
anti-Bursum groups "as a personal matter," Wilson charged that
this very attitude made legislation like the Bursum bill possible.
The idea that the Indian bureau "should be permitted to decide
everything, to do everything; and that all outside interference with
the Indians is, in effect, lese majesty, and almost high treason,"
was so deeply entrenched, he charged, that the bureau had become
incapable of comprehending the inequities contained in legislation
like Bursum's bill. This blindness had provoked the Indians' friends
to insist upon an independent commission to decide the issue of
the disputed claims.

Francis Wilson. Ralph E. Twitchell, Leading Facts of New Mexico History, vol.
4, facing p. 100.
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Wilson's defense of a Pueblo lands board, however, failed to
impress .senator Lemoot any more than had Twitchell's defense of
the Bursum bill. Since the Jones bill contained no guidelines for
the decisions of the board, Lemoot queried, what would determine
its decisions? After some fumbling, Wilson replied that the board
would be guided by "good conscience and justice." Could not an
unfriendly board do more harm. to the Indians than the Bursum
bill, Lemoot persisted? Wilson replied that since the appointments
to the board would have to be confirmed by the Senate, he was
confident that the Indians' friends would prevail to ensure that men
of "high character" would be chosen. At this point Commissioner
Burke sarcastically interjected that the same could be said for the
secretary of the interior and the commissioner of Indian affairs,
both of whom had been confirmed by the Senate. Lemoot simply
expressed his amazement at Wilson's credulity. In much the same
fashion as Twitchell had previously done, Wilson now began to
admit that his bill too contained weaknesses and that it would have
to be revised.
On the. final day of hearings, Albert Fall appeared. He repeated
his intention to resign on 4 March 1923, but, as he had earlier
written Senator Reed Smoot, the chairman of the parent commit-.
tee, until he did so his department was unalterably opposed to the
Jones bill. Not only would the arbitration provision in the bill
deprive whites of due process, he claimed, but the cost of a special
board and a special Indian attorney would be an unnecessary expense upon American taxpayers. The hearings ended on a sour
note. Fall refused to submit to examination by Francis Wilson, and
he reiterated his vow to oppose the Jones bill so long as he remained
in office. When Senator Lemoot elicited pledges from Twitchell
and Wilson to work together on a substitute bill, Fall announced
that he would refuse to "sit down at a conference table with those
of a 'faction' who think we are not worthy of trust. "13
When the senate hearings ended on 25 January, only a week
remained to prepare for the house hearings where the revised
Bursum bill introduced by Congressman Snyder was to be considered. At the request of Congressman E. O. Leatherwood of Utah,
whose wife was a member of the GFWC, the Jones bill had been
introduced in the House in early JailUary, and with Snyder's permission, it too was to be discussed.
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During the brief interval between the hearings, Collier began
to doubt the loyalty of the other Indian defense groups. As a result
of Fall's threats, he wrote Mabel podge, most of them had become
"scared cats." There were "divisive influences at work for compromise," he warned; in the event of a showdown only Stella Atwood
and "perhaps" Father Schuster could be counted upon to stand
firm in defense of the Pueblos' claims. 14
The "compromise" that Collier feared did not surface during the
house hearings. While admitting that the Snyder bill was an improvement over the original Bursum bill, Francis Wilson, nevertheless opposed the bill because it granted jurisdiction over the
Pueblos and their lands to the federal court, and it would uphold
the claims of all the non-Indians who could show possession for
twenty years prior to 10 June 1910. The most equitable way to
solve the problem, Wilson continued to insist, was through the
creation of a special board with arbitration powers. He also insisted
that a provision in the Snyder bill that granted tracts of land from
the public domain or money compensation to those whose claims
were rejected, was impracticaL What the dispossessed claimants,
Indians and non-Indians alike, needed was water, and the only bill
that made any provision for enlarging the irrigable lands along the
Rio Grande was the Jones bill. 15
The congressmen listened patiently to Wilson's presentations,
but when Stella Atwood took the floor it became quickly evident
that the committee intended to discredit her role as spokeswoman
for the GFWC. They wanted to know in detail how much money
she had raised, for what purposes it was intended, from whom it
Game, and how much Collier was being paid. They inquired whether
she had received the formal endorsement of the GFWC in her
campaign against the Bursum bill and whether the GFWC had
authorized her to use its name to collect money. She was forced
to admit that very little of the $6,000 raised for the Pueblo aid
fund had yet been used for this purpose and that the G FWC had
not formally approved her fund raising efforts. She also confessed
that she had not approved two inflammatory articles on the Pueblos
by Collier in the January and February issues of Sunset magazine.
Atwood was visibly shaken by the committee's badgering and by
the strictures of Congressman Leatherwood who concluded that
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she had obviously exceeded her authority in claiming the support
of the two million members of the GFWC.
At this point Collier, who had deliberately adopted a low profile
at the hearings, asked for permission to speak. Accusing committee
members of deliberately "crucifying" Atwood, he launched into an
impassioned attack on the already discredited Bursum bill and then
quickly passed on to a general denunciation of the Indian bureau.
For years, he charged, the bureau had failed to make "an effective
appeal" to Congress or to the American people for sufficient funds
to provide adequate medical treatment for the Indians. As soon as
he completed his harangue, the committee, obviously delighted to
have the opportunity to question: him directly, immediately zeroed
in on his role in the publicity campaign.
A letter was produced from a San Francisco newspaper alleging
that every congressman had been sent a copy of the January Sunset
article at the expense of the GFWC. Collier denied any involvement on his part or that of Atwood. The Sunset article referred to
"certain land-grabbing interests and for the time being, the executive branch of the government." Did that imply that employees
of the federal government would benefit from the passage of the
Bursum bill, Leatherwood inquired? Collier denied such an insinuation. He had only sought to "convey the impression" that the
Interior Department had framed a bill "inexcusably loose by putting
in it phraseology which did not protect the Indians and which would
destroy them." Nor, when he charged that empowering the federal
court to exert jurisdiction over the Pueblos would "tear their heart
out," did he mean to imply that this had been the "deliberate intent
of the framers of the Bursum bill." Congressman Snyder also wanted
to know how Collier could claim in the two Sunset articles that the
Bursum bill had been blocked in the House by the action of the
GFWC when his committee had not even heard about the bill until
after it had been withdrawn by the Senate. To this Collier replied
that the bill had passed the Senate when it "was asleep" and that
"maybe" the same would have happened in the House had it not
been for all the publicity generated.
Satisfied that it had effectively punched large holes in the propaganda balloon, the committee dismissed Collier and turned to
Assistant Commissioner Edgar Meritt. Testifying on the last day of
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the. hearing, Meritt told the congressmen that a special appropri~
ation to enlarge the Pueblos' irrigable land was unnecessary. If
additional irrigated acres were desirable, the bureau could finance
such a project out ofcurrent appropriations. Meritt also discounted
Collier's argument for .increased. medical attention. The Pueblos,
he said, were receiving the same medical care as other Indians and
it was quite adequate. As the hearings ended, Congressman Leatherwood announced that he could no longer support the idea of a
special Pueblo lands board, and he urged that the appropriation
request for irrigation and drainage projects be dropped from the
Jones bill on technical grounds. As an appropriation item, it would
have to be considered separately from a bill to resolve the Pueblo
land question. 16
As the hearings on the Bursum bill ended, Collier's mind was
already racing far ahead of the Pueblo problem. His attention now
focused on a larger enterprise, the formation of a national organization dedicated to the total reform of federal Indian policy. Confident that the Pueblos were safe until the next session of Congress
and eager to take advantage of the interest in Indians that the
publicity against the Bursum bill had generated, he hastily left
Washington on 17 February for Chicago. There he conferred with
Harold Ickes and others, encouraging them to join with his New
York friends in the formation of what eventually became known as
the American Indian Defense Association (AIDA). 17
The day after Collier left Washington for Chicago, .the Senate
Sub-Committee on Public Lands, whose chairman Irvine Lemoot
had genuinely sought to reconcile the warring factions, met to draft
a compromise bill. Francis Wilson was forbidden to attend this
executive session of the committee on Fall's orders, but he was
permitted to submit a draft bill indicating the changes that he would
accept. Commissioner Burke was permitted to sit with the committee.
The "Lemoot substitute" bill that emerged and that Wilson,
Burke, and both congressional committees quickly approved was
a distinct improvement over the original Bursum bill, and it accurately reflected the desires of all parties except Collier. As later
exchanges between Collier and Wilson revealed, its only failing
was that it recognized a limited number of non-Indian claims with-
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out compensation to the Indians. For Wilson and his supporters,
the recognition of these claims had been inevitable from the beginning. For Collier, who maintained that the Indian claim was
inviolate, Wilson's concessions smacked of collusion with the enemy.
The Lenroot bill provided for the creation of a three-man Pueblo
lands board, to consist of the representatives of the attorney general
ofthe United States, the secretary ofthe interior, and the president.
This board would have authority to determine all lands' to which
the Indians legitimately held title and to file a suit in the U. S.
District Court of New Mexico to quiet title to these lands. NonIndian claimants who disagreed with the findings of the board could
appeal its findings to the federal district court. Two classes of claimants who might expect to have their claims upheld were defined
in sections four and five. First, were those who could prove "open,
notorious, actual, exclusive, continuous possession for more than
twenty years prior to the passage" of the act, under "color of title."
Second, were those claimants who, while unable to prove color of
title, could demonstrate "claim of ownership" for more than thirty
years prior to passage of the act. Whatever the decision of the
district court in these disputed cases, the secretary of the interior
was to notify Congress of the court's decision and to make recommendations for compensation to the losing party. No compensation, however, was authorized in the Lenroot bill.
. With Wilson's approval, Lenroot's substitute bill was accepted
by Senators Jones, Borah, and LaFollette. The bill was immediately
forwarded to the House of Representatives where the Indian Affairs
Committee likewise approved it on 27 February. The house committee, however, .felt obliged to comment on the storm of propaganda that surrounded the Pueblo problem. "Nothing to compare
with it has heretofore been seen in connection with Indian legislation," the committee report read. "This propaganda has been
insidious, untruthful, and malicious and will result in great harm
to the Indians of this country if it is permitted to be continued."
On 28 February the Lenroot substitute passed the Senate under
the unanimous consent rule. Senator Jones, who had unsuccessfully
defended the right of the Indians to select an attorney to represent
them before the district court, attempted to insert such a provision
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on the floor of the Senate, but his motion was defeated. Otherwise
there was complete agreement on the bill's provisions.
On 3 March, the next-to-Iast-day of the Sixty-seventh Congress,
the Lemoot substitute was brought before the House of Representatives. Under the unanimous consent rule it was killed by an
obscure congressman from Kentucky who gave no reason for his
opposition. Thus, without Collier's knowledge that anything was
amiss, a bill to resolve the Pueblo dispute along lines totally unacceptable to him was narrowly defeated. His anger at being thus
outmaneuvered would prove to be deep and long lasting. His tenuous relationship with Wilson and the NMAIA would be severed
within a few months and his bright dream of a powerful national
organization would be permanently crippled. 18
Throughout the spring and summer of 1923 Collier's chief concern was the formation of the national organization through which
he hoped to force a total reform of federal Indian policy. At the
same time, he launched an investigation into Navajo affairs, challenged the Indian bureau's restrictions on Indian dances and religious ceremonials, and wrote several articles for Sunset and Survey
magazines. 19 In all these matters he was handicapped by the steadily widening gulf between himself and Francis Wilson over the
Pueblo situation. Not only was there the problem ofwhat Congress
might do when it reconvened in the fall; there was also the larger
consideration that a permanent split between the various antiBursum forces would play into the hands of the opposition and
stalemate the movement for other reforms that Collier was determined to realize. For months Collier uncharacteristically hesitated
to comment publicly upon the deficiencies in the Lemoot substitute bill for fear of alienating Wilson's supporters. Beneath the
surface calm, however, he. and Wilson carried on an increasingly
bitter correspondence. By summer they had become irrevocably
estranged, and by fall the always tenuous unity of the anti-Bursum
forces had been shattered.
The conflict between Collier and Wilson was a basic one that,
curiously enough, had never been exposed during their many months
of cooperation against the Bursum bill. For Collier, the Sandoval
decision in 1913 meant that all encroachments on Pueblo lands
since American occupation of the Southwe~t were illegal. If the
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federal government had performed its duties as guardian in the
proper manner, the Indians would never have lost any of their
land. Thus, whatever legislation was written to resolve the problem
would have to be based upon a presumption of Indian ownership.
The Bursum and Snyder bills were unacceptable because each
recognized non-Indian claims at the expense of the Pueblos.
Wilson and his supporters, on the other hand, believed that since
the federal courts had condoned the alienation of Pueblo lands
from 1876 until the Sandoval decision, the non-Indians who, in
good faith, had purchased Pueblo lands during this period had
rights that were as valid as those of the Indians. These rights, they
believed, should be recognized by statute. Their objection to the
Bursum bill, apart from its obviously inequitable provisions, was
that it had not required the non-Indian claimants to prove anything
more than simple possession of their lands. Wilson believed that
only those claimants who could prove "color of title" or "claim of
ownership" in addition to possession should be recognized as lawful
owners, but, unlike Collier, he did accept the primacy of these
claims. Perhaps because so much publicity was directed against
the more objectionable parts of the bill, this fundamental difference
between Collier and Wilson remained obscured.
During a face-to-face confrontation in Santa Fe in late March,
Collier and Wilson were unable to settle their differences. Following that meeting, Wilson prepared an extensive brief in which he
defended his support of the Lenroot bill by setting forth the differences between it and the Bursum bill. The Lenroot bill, he
wrote, omitted the potentIally dangerous extension of federal court
jurisdiction over the internal affairs of the Pueblos that the local
agents had long advocated. The jurisdiction of the state courts over
Indian lands and water rights had been rejected. The admission of
secondary evidence as proof of possession was eliminated. The
clause permitting non-Indian claimants to purchase Indian lands
with the approval of the secretary of the interior was also deleted.
As for the limitations clauses, which Collier so vehemently opposed, Wilson argued that "the attempt to make proof of possession
... confer title upon the non-Indian claimants is wholly destroyed
and defeated." Instead, the Lenroot bill contained two "true adverse title" provisions that required non-Indian claimants to prove
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either twenty years of adverse possession under "color of title" or
thirty years of adverse possession "with the claim of ownership."
He personally had advocated twenty-five and thirty-five years, but
the senate committee had not accepted this recommendation, In
any event, he concluded, the statute of limitations in the Lenroot
bill bore "no. resemblance to the pretended statute of limitations
in the Bursum and Snyder bills. "20
When Collier received his copy of Wilson's brief, he concluded
that "plainer language must be used" than he had employed during
their Santa Fe conference. "At Santa Fe, I did not wish to clash
with you, so I left unsaid what I now tell you," he wrote on April
13. At Santa Fe, Collier continued, Wilson had repeatedly insisted
that he had told Collier during their conversations in Washington
in early February that a "shift to a limitations policy was under
way. I replied that you certainly had not informed me and my
memory is borne out by the event, for I left Washington feeling
confident, and entered no protest against a change of policy, undertaken or contemplated, which I would have resisted to the
uttermost had I known of it. " Wilson, he now charged, had deliberately kept him in the dark to prevent the opposition that he knew
would result: "Your conduct must stand condemned. "21
Whether Wilson deceived Collier or whether Collier imagined
Wilson's duplicity to cover his own mistake at leaving Washington
early is not clear. Most likely a genuine difference ofopinion existed
between the two rrien that had never been made explicit during
their months of cooperation. But Collier was not content just to
charge Wilson with deception. He insisted upon indulging himself
in a gratuitous analysis of the motives that he believed had impelled
Wilson's "defection." Clearly, he wrote, Wilson had never conceived the Pueblos' plight as "a matter of fundamental social justice." As a lawyer, Wilson viewed the problem merely as a matter
requiring "an adequate technical legal defense." Wilson's adherence "to the real cause," Collier now realized, was never based on
principle but only upon his "appreciation of the legal accidents
which happened to work in favor of that cause." For this reason,
once Wilson became aware of the impact that an assertion of the
Indian claim would have on the "white settlers" and upon his political future, he had taken the easy way out by creating "a new
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legal synthesis, a new lot of legal sanctions, and a perfect feeling
of virtue behind the walls of a new ivory tower of legalism." In
retrospect, Collier could see how 'Wilson had viewed his approval
of the Lenroot bill as a simple choice between, on the one hand,
poor Indians who had "that curious tendency Indians have of evaporating out of all consciousness or ceasing to appear as persons at
all ! ! r' and their handful of true supporters; and, on the other, an
important political victory over Albert Fall that "was irresistible in
its appeal to your ... vanity shall I say?"As a result of Fairs "vicious
attack," Wilson had sought the help of Senators Lenroot and Jones.
When these men later asked for his cooperation in getting the
substitute bill through Congress, Wilson found himself unable "to
buck their opinion and wishes" and instead had embraced the compromise that could be "proclaimed as a Victory" in New Mexico.
Collier added: "I expect that incidents of this kind-on the part of
individuals and of groups as well-will be not. infrequent as the
full sweep of our effort goes ahead. They will mean difficulty but
not failure. For yourself .. . the issue is in no matter personal
between me and you; yet I must tell you 'that results for the Indians
are going to be paramount-quite ruthlessly so-in any controversy
ahead." He was carefully refraining from expressing such thoughts
in public, Collier warned, only because they would "hurt the cause
and give unholy joy to the Indian Office," but he would not shrink
from public controversy if Wilson persisted in his support for the
Lenroot bill. "Controversy is better than surrender, and when
waged it must be waged effectively. . . . You will find this analysis
painful to your self esteem," he concluded, "but I want to show
that I have not . . . implied that you are a knave or a fool."22
On 17 April 1923, Francis Wilson replied in kind. "I have neither
the time nor the inclination to answer the mud slinging orgy that
you have indulged in this time," he wrote. "As evidence against
you, your letters . '. . cannot be improved upon and so far as I am
concerned they will pass as proof out of your own mouth of your
undisciplined and unprincipled mind and temperament." There
was a "fundamental and unavoidable" difference between them that
he had not perceived earlier, Wilson wrote. Collier, he had discovered, was "instinctively and apparently fundamentally ... opposed to any orderly process of the law.,. . . No law could be
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passed that would be satisfactory to you because of your attitude
and frame of mind toward law in general . . . . Your egotism and
supreme belief in your own infallibility ... is such as to make
open minded discussion with you impossible and that, united with
the fundamental defect in your mental and moral makeup suggested
above, make any future attempt to clarify your mind a wholly
useless effort and a task certain to be fruitless. I shall go no farther
in the matter."23
As usual, Collier had the last word. On 22 April in the final
exchange of correspondence, he agreed with Wilson that the difference in their philosophical positions was indeed fundamental. _
"You accept the existing synthesis as being final ... and sacrosanct," he wrote, "I mean the existing business system with all its
legal apparatus." What he was fighting for, Collier said, was "a new
. synthesis ... a sociological synthesis ... a system more life giving
andjust."To achieve that end it would be necessary to demonstrate
unceasingly that the "present bureaucratic monopoly over the Indians" was "un-American and, in spirit at least, anti-constitutional."
Wilson, he was sure, would not subscribe to this view. 24
Following this exchange, Collier's New York supporters terminated their affiliation with Wilson, and he ceased to play an official
role in the Pueblo claims case. A final quarrel occurred when Wilson
submitted his bill for $4,984. Whether it was ever paid is not clear.
In a report to the AIDA board, Collier wrote that there had never
been any understanding as to Wilson's fee, but he considered Wilson's statement "excessive" as did Kate Vosburg and Mabel Dodge
who had contributed most of the $1,300 that Wilson had previously
been paid. Collier was particularly critical of Wilson's per diem
charge of $50 per day. He refused to endorse any payment for
Wilson's services after 8 February 1923, the day he had earlier
determined that Wilson had reversed "his instructions. "25
Following the break with Francis Wilson, Collier began the search
for a replacement. The choice eventually centered on A. A. Berle,
Jr., a member of the prestigious New York law firm of Rounds,
Hatch, Dillingham, and Debevoise. Berle was eminently qualified
for the task. A child prodigy who entered Harvard at age fourteen,
he received his bachelor's degree with honors three years later and
then went on to become the youngest graduate of the Harvard Law
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school at twenty one. Immediately after completing his legal studies, he entered the law office of Supreme Court Justice Louis
Brandeis and then joined the army when World War I broke out.
During the war he served in the military intelligence branch, Caribbean section, and afterwards was one of the experts chosen to
accompany President Woodrow Wilson to the Versailles peace negotiations. Quickly disillusioned by Wilson's many compromises,
he resigned in 1919, entered the firm of Rounds, Hatch, Dillingham, and Debevoise, and began to teach at the Harvard Law
school. As a result of his wartime work in the Dominican Republic,
Berle had become "quite familiar with old Spanish colonial law," a
prerequisite for anyone who hoped to draft legislation resolving
the Pueblo crisis. Through his mother who, prior to her marriage,
had been a missionary to the Sioux, he could' even claim a degree
of empathy with the Indians. Berle later recalled that Collier had
come to the firm seeking advice on the Pueblo problems. "Nobody
in the firm had much interest in it," he wrote, except himself, "so
I took a vacation." Hired in May 1923, he spent the summer researching the problem, and in August he joined Collier in New·
Mexico to get a close-up view of the situation. 26
Berle arrived in Santa Fe on 3 August and was immediately taken
in tow by Collier. Two days later he went to Taos to meet Mary
status
he acknowledged
Austin and Mabel Dodge, whose celebrity
I
in his diary by placing an exclamation point after her name. For
two hours they pored over a draft bill that Berle had prepared as
a substitute for the Lenroot bill, then agreed that an All Pueblo
Council should be convened at Santo Domingo on 25 August. In
the meanwhile BerIe, Collier, and Tony Luhan were to visit several
of the northern pueblos where they would confer with the local
councils. BerIe was also taken on a tour of some of the disputed
tracts. "It is no joke to evict the Mexicans," he noted in his diary;
"it goes against my grain to throw out a family whose land is tilled
and whose house is surrounded by hollyhocks and larkspur. No
help for it though. We must get them some compensation."
The members of the NMAIA were angered by Collier's convening of the All Pueblo Council without consulting them, and they
were not appeased when Berle unveiled the details of his bill to
them on 24 August. Essentially it called for the relinquishment of
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Indian title to certain areas that had long been occupied by nonIndians, but only ifcompensation was made for these losses. Other
agricultural lands might also be relinquished, with compensation,
but Berle's draft clearly stated that no lands should be taken from
the Pueblos without their consent. The bill also called for compensation to the non-Indian claimants who would be evicted from
their lands. 28
Immediately the NMAIA members protested. Berle's bill, they
argued, was "incomplete" and "unsound," for it promised the Pueblos more than they could legitimately expect to get and would leave
them dissatisfied and angIyNeither Collier nor 'Berle, however,
indicated a willingness to modify the draft. As a result, when the
council met the following day, both opposing white groups were
present as was the Indian bureau in the person of Nina Otero
Warren. 29
At the 25 August meeting, ninety-eight Pueblo delegates representing all the Pueblos assembled. Berle, Collier, Stella Atwood,
Tony Luhan, and Mary Austin were there for the AIDA; Margaret
McKittrick, Witter Bynner, and Alice Henderson represented the
NMAIA. The meeting opened with an explanation of Berle's bill.
As soon as Berle finished, McKittrick, spearheading what Berle
termed a "raid by the New Mexico Association," attempted to break
up the meeting. Pleading that Berle's bill did not "represent all
the associations interested in Indian Welfare" and that Collier had
"sprung" this meeting without consulting the other groups, she
asked the Pueblos not to take any action until a program on which
all could unite had been formulated. The delegates, however, permitted Collier to speak, and at the end of his defense they adopted
a set of resolutions that he had prepared. With this, the NMAIA
members stalked out of the assembly; and in Alice Henderson's
words, "the break that we tried to avert all summer, occurred. "30
The resolutions that the Pueblos adopted were lengthy and explicit. No land should be taken from the Pueblos without their
consent, and then only with compensation. The Pueblos would
agree to recognize the rights of non-Indians to several townsites,
church sites; cemeteries, and '~public service corporations," and
would agree to exclude them from litigation if compensation, equal
to their agricultural value, were paid. The federal government was
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to blame for the necessity of evicting other claimants and should
recognize its obligation to compensate them. The "peculiarly flagrant land seizures" that had taken place since statehood should
be "dealt with drastically and· at once." A law should be passed
making it a federal crime to encroach on Pueblo lands; the title to
Pueblo lands must be affirmed by a law that would deny the right
oCnon-Indians to claim them through the "adverse possession"
statutes of New Mexico territory. Where Spanish land grants overlappedthe Pueblo claims, Indian claims should be restored or
compensation should be made. Lastly, the delegates authorized the
AIDA and the Indian welfare committee of the GFWC to take the
necessary legal steps to protect their claims~ According to Collier,
all the delegates approved these resolutions except those from
Laguna who were not authorized to bind their people. 31 ..
Five days later the break with the NMAIA was made final at a
meeting of the association'sdirectors in Santa Fe. Francis Wilson
denounced Collier's high handed tactics, particularly the resolutions he had put before the delegates,. saying that unless they were
challenged their adoption would mean that only the AIDA and the
GFWC would be recognized as the Indians' benefactors. Such an
event, he protested, was ~'not fair to the Indians nor to us." By this
time, however, the die had been cast. Collier and Atwood, refusing
to meet with the New Mexico Association, left Santa Fe on 5 September for the "West via the Southern Pueblos. 32
Collier's role in the final drama of the Pueblo land dispute,
however, was I limited. Following a strenuous fall in· which he repeatedly criss-crossed the nation mobilizing opposition to the Lenroot substitute bill, convening Pueblo councils, and raising money,
he became ill in January on the eve of the new Congressional
session and returned to California where· he underwent surgery for
an unspecified illness in late March 1924. By the time he recovered
sufficiently to travel again, the Pueblo Lands Act had been hammered out in Washington. The primary responsibility for negotiating this settlement of the Pueblo problem fell to Berlewho, as
a result of his earlier work, was retained by the AIDA on a fulltime basis from December 1923 to June 1924. 33
. In mid-January 1924, Senator Charles Curtis, himselfan Indian,
was persuaded to introduce Berle~s bill into the Senate. It stated
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clearly the position of the AIDA: all lands· owned by the Pueblos
at the time American sovereignty was established in the Southwest
still belonged to them and could not bereliriquished without their
permission and payment of adequate compensation. Berle's argument was that the Pueblos, as wards of the government, had been
unfairly and illegally despoiled of their lands by the failure of their
guardian, the United States, to adequately protect their rights. The
questions of title and compensation were thereby squarely joined
in the rival Lenroot and Curtis bills. This time, however, the public
acrimony that accompanied the debate over the Bursum bill was
to be avoided. A sub-committee composed of the two New Mexico
senators, Bursum and Jones, with Alva Adams of Colorado as chairman, was created to meet with the opposing attorneys and charged
with responsibility for effecting a compromise. In the absence of
formal hearings, an understanding of what transpired in these confrontations is necessarily limited, but correspondence between Collier, Berle, and Adams during March and April 1924, the period
of the most intense negotiations, provides a glimpse of the most
important concessions and the arguments advanced for their acceptance. 34
The major debate centered on the applicability of the New Mexico territorial statutes of limitation to the disputed Pueblo lands.
In November 1923, Francis Wilson, now aligned with the antiCollier forces, had further revised the Lenroot bill by drafting a
new statutes of limitation clause. This clause ultimately became
sections 4a and 4b of the Pueblo Lands Act of 1924. According to
its provisions, all non-Indian claimants who could prove "open,
notorious, actual, exclusive, continuous, adverse possession" under
color of title from 6 January 1902 to the date of passage of the ~ct,
or similar possession "with claim of ownership but without color
of title" from 16 March 1889 to the date of passage of the act, were
to be given title to their claims and the Indian title voided. The
dates Wilson chose were those specified in the New Mexico territorial statutes oflimitation and their acceptance, he argued, would
legitimatize and protect the valid claims of non-Indian settlers. 35
Berle's response to the revised Lenroot bill was that its statutes
of limitation clause was unconstitutional on two counts. One, because the New Mexico statutes of limitation could never have run
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against the federal 'government in its capacity as guardian to' the
Pueblos, and two, because the inclusion of the statutes in the
Pueblo bill would create a retroactive right in the non-Indians.
Berle's argument impressed the senators enough that they notified
Commissioner Burke of the problem, thereby precipitating an investigation "to see if there is any merit in the contention that [Berle]
is advocating." Apparently there was. 36
The result of the debate on the statutes of limitation was that
they were incorporated into the Pueblo Lands Act exactly as drafted
by Wilson, but with the addition of two important qualifications.
One of these was that the non-Indian clajmants would also have to
demonstrate continuous payment of taxes on their lands from the
dates specified in sections 4a and 4b to the date of passage of the
act. The second was that the Pueblos, at any time prior to the
actual patenting of land to the non-Indians, could assert an independent claim in federal court based on "any existing right" they
might have prior to passage of the act; In effect, this second qualification removed the objection to the "retroactive" nature of the
statutes of limitation. 37
Having prOVided non-Indians with the possibility of establishing
a valid claim to their lands, the sub-committee then agreed that
the Pueblos and the "good faith" non-Indians who lost lands were
entitled to compensation from the federal government. The decisions on title and the determination of compensation values would
be made by a three-man Pueblo Lands Board. Non-Indians could
dispute the findings of the Lands Board in title matters in the
federal district court, and Pueblos could contest the compensation
awards in the same court. 38
Despite their absolute stance in defense of the Pueblos' claim to
all disputed land the year before, Collier and Berle now agreed to
support the amended bill. At least four reasons for their change of
mind emerge from the correspondence. One was their acceptance
of the facts of political life. Non-Indians and their political representatives would accept no legislative solution to the vexing land
problem that did not guarantee, as a minimum, the protection of
the territorial statutes of limitation. The only alternative to acceptance of the statutes would be a lengthy and costly court case
that the Pueblos, despite Collier's confidence in the federal courts,
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might lose. The second reason was the assurance of compensation
that had earlier been denied. A third reason was the strong belief
in the Collier camp that few, ifany, of the non-Indians would be
able to show continuous payment of taxes on lands they claimed.
Because of this belief, Collier and his supporters did not expect
the losses to the Pueblos to be serious. Lastly, it was believed that
the threat of an independent Pueblo suit would exert sufficient
pressure upon the Pueblo Lands Board to decide any doubtful
cases in favor of the Indians. 39
Once a bargain had been struck on the terms of the amended
bill, Bursum was permitted to take credit for its introduction, and
the Lenroot and Curtis bills were dropped. At the last moment a
hitch developed when the committee deleted the provision making
the Pueblo compensation awards binding on the federal government and instead substituted a provision making them merely a
"recommendation" to Congress. Berle, in consultation with the
hospitalized Collier, adamantly refused to accept the change. Advised by Senator Adams that Congress would not accept "a measure
which provides that the decision of any administrative board shall
be the equivalent of a conclusive judgment against the United
States," and that unless they dropped their opposition, "it is highly
unlikely that any bill affecting this subject will be passed," Collier
and Berle accepted defeat. "The denouement in the Pueblo land
situation is a bitter disappointment," Berle wrote Collier, but "I
have replied [to Senator Adams] that as between a bill which does
not provide a binding. award of compensation and no legislation at
all, we prefer nothing. "40
Then, through a direct appeal to the chairman of. the parent
Public Land Committee, E. F. Ladd, Berle saved the bill and the
compensation provision. With Ladd's approval, Berle hastily drafted
an amendment subjecting the compensation awards to review by
the federal district court but making the court's action binding
upon the federal government. This proved acceptable and the bill
sailed through both houses of Congress and was signed into law
on 7 June 1924 (43 Stat., 636).
In Collier's subsequent writings he focused on the defeat of the
first Bursum bill and said relatively little about the Pueblo Lands
Act or its implementation. Perhaps that is because most of the
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assumptions upon which he had based his acceptance of the act
proved false in the years that followed. Collier had expected to
influence appointments to the board to insure its sympathy to the
Pueblo position, but all his nominees were rejected. Most of the
board's decisions favored the settlers, and its compensation awards
were far less thil.ll those that had been expected. Many of its awards
to the Indians were later overturned in the district court, which
interpret~d the contiquous taX payment requirement for the nonIndians in such a way as to make it virtually inapplicable. By 1931
when the board completed its work, the Pueblos had lost many
acres of irrigated land for which they had been awarded very little
compensation. At that time Collier mounted a furious campaign in
both the courts and the Congress that succeeded only when he
became Indian commissioner if} 1933.... But that is another story.
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